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IN THE SUPR.EME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
N.J. MEAGHER, Jr., MARY ALICE 
ARENTZ, KATHERINE C. IVERS, 
MARGARET FRANCES PRICE, N. J. 
MEAGHER and KATHERINE T. 
MEAGHER, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
(Appellants and Respondents) 
-vs.-
vVEBER OIL COMPANY, JOE T. 
JUHAN and PAUL STOC.K, 
Defendants, 
(Appellants and Respondents) 
and 
EQUITY OIL C01fP ANY and ALL 
UNKNOWN PERSONS who claim any 




BRIEF OF APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT 
WEBER OIL COMPANY 
Plaintiffs' opening brief deviates so substantially 
from the prescribed rule and contains so many half truths 
that we are required, as .an aid to the Court, to make a 
comprehensive statement of the record rather than to pin-
point the contradictions. 
Plaintiffs, in their brief, seen1 to ignore the proposi-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
tion that this is an appeal from a summary judgment with 
a record devoid of any finding of bad faith, conspiracy, 
fraud, breach of fiduciary relationship, damages or in-
terest. The primary question is whether the combined 
25% of the oil heretofore awarded to defendants Stock 
and Juhan is to be taken from the Stock half or the 
Phebus half of the Sheridan Lease. Weber Oil Company 
admittedly O"\Vns the Phebus half. The Stock half has 
heretofore, after mandate, been litigated (Meagher v. 
Uintah Gas Co. et al., 255 P. 2d 989). It was by the af-
firmed decree in that case that Stock and Juhan were 
awarded a combined 25% of the lessee's rights with re-
spect to oil under the lease. 
While this is the first time that the corporate de-
fendants have been named as parties in this litigation, 
factual statements are made in the two previous decisions 
of this Court ( 185 P. 2d 7 47 and 255 P. 2d 989), ''hich 
facts, we assume, need not be reiterated except as may 
be dee1ned .advisable by way of emphasis. 
STATE!fENT OF THE CASE 
Appellants' coin plaint (R. 1-1~), consisting of four 
counts, 'vas filed on !fay 11, 195-!. The Fourth Count (R. 
9-10) claims damage by reason of possible accumulations 
of inco1ne tax not yet paid by plaintiffs but which they 
say they '""ill have to pay in higher incon1e tax brackets 
in the year they receive the proceeds fron1 oil runs pro-
viding they .are entitled to such proceeds. This count ''as 
disposed of by the trial court in a for1nal order of dis-
Inissal dated December 21, 1954 (R. 113-114). No ap-
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peal is taken from the order of dismissal except that 
plaintiffs in paragraph 3 of their statement of points 
''in re appeal" of Weber Oil Company (R. 346-347) and 
their statement of points "in re the appeals of" defend-
ants Stock and Juhan (R. 368-369) refer to the ruling and 
designate the count as a "trespass to personal property." 
In the Rulings on Motions signed, dated and filed by 
the trial court on the 14th day of October, 1955 (R. 213-
215) it is ruled that "The Defendants' Motions for Sum-
mary Judgment are granted as to the first and third 
counts of the Plaintiffs' Complaint." The First Count 
(R. 1-4) is to quiet title and to cancel and remove of rec-
ord certain specific documents to the extent that the s.ame 
may be a cloud upon plaintiffs' title. The Third Count 
(R. 8) alleges that defendants have converted to their 
own use the plaintiffs' share of the oil and the proceeds 
thereof produced by defendants from the lands covered 
by the Sheridan Lease. There is no appeal or cross .ap-
peal taken from the ruling dated October 14, 1955. 
The Second Count (R. 4-8) alleges that plaintiffs are, 
and since January 27, 1948 have been, the owners in equal 
shares of the leasehold estate consisting of an undivided 
one-half interest in the lessee's rights with respect to oil 
under the so-called Sheridan Lease, and is one for an ac-
counting joined with allegations calculated to support 
the order to show cause and the temporary restraining 
order 'vhich vvas issued on the date the complaint was 
filed (R. 14-19). The restraining order was vacated and 
set aside and plaintiffs' motion for a temporary injunc-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
tion was denied and the order to show cause dismissed 
by the formal order of the court dated September 23, 1954 
(R. 123-12'5) after a he.aring at Vernal, Utah, on l\{ay 
20, 1954, which hearing was stenographically reported. 
The transcript is in the record in this case. 
At the hearing on the order to sho'v cause the court, 
as the order of September 23, 1954 states, considered the 
affidavit of N. J. Meagher, Jr. (R. 20-30), the counter 
affidavit of Weber Oil Company by J. L. Doug.an, its 
President (R. 57-65), the counter affidavit of Equity Oil 
Company by J. L. Dougan, its President and General 
~fanager (R. 66-67), and the affidavit of Paul Stock and 
Joe T. Juhan (R. 68-71), and concluded that the plaintiffs 
had failed to establish that there was any threat that 
the defendants would remove their property from the 
jurisdiction of the court and that plaintiffs had failed to 
establish .any grounds 'vhatsoever for injunctive relief. 
In the order of September 23, 1954, by paragraph 
4 thereof, defendant Equity Oil Company was required 
"pursuant to the stipulation of the parties n1ade in open 
court" to continue "to hold in a special fund an amount 
equal to 40.75 per cent of the gross c.rude oil runs from the 
property described in plaintiffs' complaint after deduct-
ing operating expenses, until the further order of the 
Court." And in the san1e order the Senior !Ieaghers 
(N.J. Meagher and !Catherine T. l\Ieagher, his "'ife) 'vere 
included as parties plaintiff, it being ordered that "they 
shall be dee1ned to have adopted the allegations of said 
complaint 'vithout further an1endinent thereof." (R. 123-
125). 
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The 40.75% of the gross crude oil runs from the 
property is the amount allocated to one-half of the work-
ing interest in the Sheridan Lease after giving effect to 
outstanding royalties totaling 18¥2%. The impounding 
w.as with the knowledge, acquiescence and approval of 
\Veber Oil Company, the defendants Stock and Juhan, 
the plaintiff N. J. ~1eagher, Sr. and a written commit-
ment made by Equity Oil Company under date of August 
31, 1950 (R. 63). 
The court in its rulings on motions dated October 
14, 1955 (R. 213-215 at page 214) concludes that Equity 
Oil Company appears only as .a "stakeholder"; that 
Equity has, pursuant to an agreement with the plaintiffs, 
maintained a special account of an amount equal to at 
least 40.75% of the gross crude oil runs .after expenses 
of operations; that plaintiffs are entitled to a summary 
judgment against the defendant Equity Oil Company on 
the Second Count of plaintiffs' complaint; for an account-
ing of the operations and profits of the oil produced by 
said defendant on the lands in question; and to a judg-
ment against defendant Equity Oil Company for an 
amo~ equal to one-half of the proceeds after operating 
expenses are deducted. 
The Interlocutory Judgment and Decree, as prepared 
by plaintiffs' counsel, was entered on December 13, 1955 
(R. 216-224). On the same day the court entered its order 
in favor of Juhan and Stock (R. 245) ordering Equity 
Oil Company to forthwith pay over to them jointly or to 
their order one-half of the 40.75% of the proceeds of the 
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gross crude oil runs then in its hands as stakeholder after 
deducting the appropriate share of operating expendi-
tures. This order conflicts with the plaintiffs' Interlocu-
tory Judgment and Decree which requires Equity Oil 
Company to pay over to the plaintiffs (excluding the 
Senior Meaghers) the entire 40.75% "less one-half of 
said expenses." All parties, including the plaintiffs but 
excluding Equity Oil Company, purport to appeal from 
the Interlocutory Judgment and Decree or parts thereof 
(R. 306, 310, 314, 346-347, 348-349, 368-369). The plain-
tiffs appeal from the order of December 13, 1955, direct-
ing Equity Oil Company to pay over to defendants Stock 
and Juhan jointly or to their order one-half of the 40.75% 
of the proceeds of gross crude oil runs held by it as 
stakeholder after deducting the appropriate proportion-
ate share of operating expenditures (R. 319). 
By an order dated December 15, 1955 and filed Decem-
ber 17, 1955 (R. 246) the court purported to recall, vacate 
and set aside its said order dated December 13, 1955, in 
favor of Juhan and Stock. The order of December 15, 
1955, is made the subject of appeal by defendants Stock 
and Juhan (R. 310). 
Specific objections to the forn1 of Interlocutory J udg-
Inent and Derree as proposed by plaintiffs 'vere made by 
defendant Weber Oil Con1pany (R. 235-241). Defendants 
Stock and Juhan filed their objections to the proposed 
Interlocutory Judgn1ent and Decree and made their 
motion for an order requiring Equity Oil Con1p.any to 
forthwith pay over to them jointly one-half of the 40.75% 
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of the gross crude oil runs after deducting the propor-
tionate share of operating expenditures, basing the mo-
tion upon the affirmed and final Dunford decree in Civil 
Case 2238 in the same court, and expressly stated that 
the motion should not be construed as an admission on 
the p.art of those defendants that plaintiffs are entitled 
to the other one-half of said 40.75% (R. 230-234). 
Civil Case 2238, Uintah County, Utah, is the same 
case taken to this Court in Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co. 
et al., 255 P. 2d 989. The Dunford decree referred to is 
the Judgment and Decree dated June 4, 1951, a certified 
copy of which, together with the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law .are found at pages 281-305 of the 
record herein. The Dunford decree is the subject of 
the remittitur from this Court dated February 11, 1953, 
and introduced as evidence in the instant case as Exhibit 
5, which remittitur reads in part as follows: 
"This cause having been heretofore argued 
and submitted and the Court being sufficiently 
advised in the premises, it is now ordered, .ad-
. judged and decreed that the judgment of the lower 
court be, and the same is modified in accordance 
with the views expressed in the opinion filed here-
in, and as so modified the judgment is affirmed, 
each party to bear its own costs on appeal. 
ISSUED January 20, 1954" 
In the instant case, .after the filing of the answer 
and counterclaim of defendant Weber Oil Company (R. 
80-90), the answer of defendant Equity Oil Company 
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(I{. 91-95), the answer and counterclaim of defendant 
Juhan (R. 96-100), the answer and counterclaim of de-
fendant Stock (R. 101-112), the reply of plaintiffs to the 
counterclaim contained in the answer of defendants Stock 
and Juhan (R. 149-154) and the reply of plaintiffs to the 
respective pleadings filed by Weber Oil Company and 
Equity Oil Company (R. 155-160), the plaintiffs filed 
their motions for summary judgn1ent (R.162-163), basing 
their motions upon the records and files "of this court" 
and the affidavit of N. J. ~Ieagher in support thereof, 
portions of which affidavit (R. 165-186) the corporate 
defendants moved to strike (R. 190-202) as did the de-
fendants Stock and Juhan (R. 203-206). 
Weber Oil Company made its motion for summary 
judgment (R. 188-189) basing the same upon the records 
and files "in the within action, including the depositions 
and admissions of the plaintiffs herein and upon the de-
cision" of this Court in its Case 7723 (llfeagher v. Uintah 
Gas Co. et al., 255 P. 2d 989) and the remittitur issued 
from this Court in said case January 20, 1954. The cor-
porate defendants, by J. L. Dougan, filed their affidavit 
on motion for sun1mary judgment (R. 207-212). 
The trial court, in its rulings of October 1-±, 1955 
( R. 213-215), erroneously stated that defendants Juhan, 
Stock and Equity Oil Company had filed motions for 
sunnnary judgn1ent as well as the plaintiffs. The fact is 
that the plaintiffs and the defendant \\T eber Oil Company 
were the only ones to file n1otions for sun1n1ary judgment 
prior to the date of October 14, 1955. The court in its 
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rulings (R. 213) considered it unnecessary to rule on the 
motions to strike portions of the affidavit of N. J. 
Meagher made in support of plaintiffs' motion for a 
su1nmary judgment. 
The hearing had at Provo, Utah, on the motions for 
summary judgment on May 25, 26 and 27, 1955, was 
stenographically reported and the transcript of the hear-
ing is a part of this record. The deposition of N.J. Mea-
gher, taken in the instant case, was read into the record 
(Rep. Tr. 48-166). Among the exhibits was a quitclaim 
deed (P-7) dated ~iay 10, 1954, the day before this action 
was filed, whereby N. J. Meagher and Katherine T. Me.a-
gher, his wife, quitclaimed to the other plaintiffs, their 
children, the property described in the complaint, also 
P-13, an agreement dated April 9, 1951, between Equity 
Oil Company, Weber Oil Company, Joe T. Juhan and 
Paul Stock, recorded March 11, 1953. The entire record 
in Civil Case 2238 w.as received by the court in the hear-
ing on the motions as well as the remittitur from this 
Court in its Case 7723. 
STAT.EMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1. 
WEBER OIL COMPANY SHOULD BE DISMISSED OUT 
OF THE ACTION WITH A SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN ITS 
FAVOR AS TO THE TI'TLE THAT IT ADMIT·TEDLY OWNS. 
POINT 2. 
THE IN·TERLO,CUTORY JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF 
DECEMBER 13, 1955, IS VOID AS T·O WEBER OIL COM-
PANY. 
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POINT 3. 
THIS COUR'T CAN ONLY ACT HEREIN AS AN APPEL-
LATE COURT AND NOT AS A COURT HAVING ORIGINAL 
JURISDitCTION. 
POINT 4. 
THE INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
WAS AN IMPOSITION UP'ON THE TRIAL COURT. 
POINT 5. 
THE FOURTH COUNT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM AS 
AGAINST ANY OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
ARGU1fENT 
Appendices A, B, C, H, I, J, K, M and Nat the end 
of plaintiffs' . brief all refer to matters adjudicated in 
Civil Case 2238 and finally disposed of b-y this Court on 
appeal in Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co. et al., 255 P. 2d 989. 
The question immediately arises as to how many times 
matters can be litigated and when have the plaintiffs ex-
hausted their cause of action. The tenor of plaintiffs' 
brief 'vould be to accept in part and to reject in part that 
which has been previously litigated. The various indicia 
of ownership, if any, and the testimony of the witnesses 
loses its identity and has become merged in the judgment 
by all of the authorities. The plaintiffs in the instant case, 
by clever subtlety, are atte1npting (1) to avoid the con-
sequences of their failure to appeal or cross appeal in 
the previous case fron1 the deeree a'Yarding Stock one-
sixteenth and Juhan three-sixteenths of the oil produced 
under the Sheridan Lease (~~ of the 40.75%); and (2} 
to avoid their omission to join in a petition for rehearing 
in the last appeal (Case 7723). To obscure these funda-
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mental omissions they indulge in name calling beneath 
the dignity of reply, and in so doing hope to divert at-
tention from the real issues involved. 
POINT 1. 
WEBER OIL COMPANY SHOULD BE DISMISSED OUT 
OF THE ACTION WITH A SUMMAR.Y JUDGMENT IN ITS 
FAVOR AS TO THE TITLE THAT IT ADMITTEDLY OWNS. 
The .affidavit of N. J. Meagher, Jr. herein (R. 27-
28) referring to Civil Case 22'38, the former action, states: 
"The trial court, on March 6, 1951, adjudi-
cated that Meagher, for the use and benefit of his 
grantees, the plaintiffs herein, w.as, as against 
defendants Juhan and Stock, the owner of the half 
interest in the lease to which he asserted title. 
Neither defendant Equity Oil Company nor de-
fendant Weber Oil Company were parties to that 
litigation for, as hereinabove recited, issues had 
been joined thereon long before either of said p.ar-
ties acquired any interest whatsoever in the Sheri-
dan Lease, and for the further reason that the 
only interest or title held by said defendants is 
derivative froJn and traceable to the Phebus one-
half interest, which one-half interest is not in 
dispute." (Emphasis added.) 
The second sentence of the .above quote is a direct 
admission that the Phebus half of the Sheridan Lease 
is not in litigation and never has been and that plaintiffs 
make no claim to the same. The first sentence of the 
quote refers to the ~Iemorandum Decision of March 6, 
1951, found at pages 140-194 of the record on appe.al in 
Case 2238 and not to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
of Law and Decree entered in that case on June 4, 1951 
(R. 281-305). The decree awards to Stock and Juhan a 
combined 25% of the oil. It is untrue to say, as does the 
first sentence of the above quote, that on March 6, 1951, 
it was adjudicated that !ieagher was, as against defend-
ants Juhan and Stock, the owner of the half interest in 
the lease to which he asserted title. 
It is interesting to note, however, that in the Memor-
andum Decision, at page 167 of former record on appeal, 
Judge Dunford rationalizes the mandate of this Court 
in the first appeal as follows : 
"By directing further proceedings, instead of 
merely ordering judgment for the defendants, or 
judgment quieting plaintiff's title subject to the 
lease, it appeared to this Court that the only pos-
sible thing contentplated by the Supreme Court 
was to deternz,ine the parties' rights under the 
lease. The plaintiff was compelled to accept that 
interpretation, and moved to have his rights, as 
well as the rights of the defendants thereunder, 
determined. The n1ost that could be said of his 
change of position is that he "\Yas 1nistaken in his 
understanding that Al and A5 (the Sheridan 
Lease and !Iodification Agreement) were void 
and constituted nothing n1ore than a cloud upon 
his property." (En1phasis added.) 
The theory announced by the trial judge (Dunford) 
was carried in to the Findings of Fact~ Conclusions of 
La'v and Decree of June 4, 1951, "\Yhere the court pro-
ceeded to delineate the whole title to the leasehold. This 
Court on appeal, 255 P. 2d 989 at p.age 992, contrary to 
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the theory that a new cause of action was before the trial 
court, said : 
"* * * that .an entirely new and different cause 
may not be pleaded by reply. Nor could a plaintiff 
in a quiet title action assert title acquired after 
its commencement. * * * We cannot view Mea-
gher's claim of one-half interest alleged in his 
amended reply as a new or different cause. After 
revers.al by this court, he conceded only half own-
ership in the originally pleaded whole. Meagher's 
action persists on the same theory, - one to quiet 
title." 
This Court states: 
"J\1eagher claims nothing through Phebus, but 
claims a one-half interest through Stock's 'release,' 
:Ill l)(l * " 
And that one of the three claims brought into the case 
since the former decision ( 185 P. 2d 7 4 7) was : 
"Stock's, by counterclaim, to assert a one-half 
interest in operating rights in 440 acres, in oppo-
sition to Meagher's identical claim." 
In the previous decision, 185 P. 2d 7 47 at page 7 48, it is 
stated: 
"On January 19, 1945, Phebus quitclaimed his 
interest to Juhan." 
This Court in 255 P. 2d 989, at p.age 991, finds that: 
"Defendant Juhan has transferred his inter-
est in the operating rights to Equity Oil, and it 
to Weber Oil, neither litigants here." 
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N. J. Meagher, Jr. in the portion of his affidavit quoted 
above unequivocally identifies the interest now held by 
'V eber Oil Company as the Phebus one-half interest. 
Paragraph number 13 of N. J. Meagher's (Sr.) affi-
davit in support of plaintiffs' motion for summary judg-
ment states: 
"On January 19, 1945, Phebus executed the 
aforesaid quitclaim transferring his interest in the 
Sheridan Lease to Juhan. 
Plaintiffs assert no title to said Phebus in-
terest in the Sheridan Lease." (R. 167) 
At the Provo hearing on the motion for summary 
judgment the difference between counsel as to interpre-
tation of the Dunford decree, as modified by this Court 
on appeal, is strikingly pointed out: 
"MR. GUSTIN: What right, after the Dun-
ford decree and after it had been adjudicated by 
the Supreme Court that the subject matter was 
the Stock half, 'vhat is there out of that half that 
could now be litigated unless you are impeaching 
the Dunford decree~ 
MR. 'VHEAT: ''Tell, the ans,ver is simple, 
the Supreme Court did 'not adjudicate the Stock 
half was the subject n1atter of the litigation." 
(Rep. Tr. 292) (En1phasis added) 
To say that the Stock h.alf "\vas not the subject matter 
of litigation in the last appeal is spurious. This Court 
leaves no roo1n for equiYocation that l\Ieagher clanns 
nothing through Phebus but elan11s a one-half interest 
through Stork's "release," the ... principal subject of this 
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suit." It necessarily follows that out of the subject I?atter 
in litig.ation Stock was decreed one-sixteenth and Juhan 
was decreed three-sixteenths of the oil- (¥2 of 40.75%). 
This facet of the decree was affirmed by this Court and 
,\ras never the subject of appeal. 
The decree in favor of Stock and Juhan was a divi-
sible independent portion thereof and if the plaintiffs had 
questioned it they should have taken their cross appe.al. 
Rosenthyne v. ·Matth•ews-McCulloch Co., 51 Utah 38, 168 
P. 957, Reimann v. Baum, 115 Utah 147, 203 P. 2d 387, 
and Spendlove v. Shewchuck, 116 Utah 248, 209 P. 2d 247, 
in which latter case it is stated that when the respondent 
does not cross appeal and does not assign the ruling of 
the lower court .as error, then "respondent has not raised 
any issue before this court which the court can review.'' 
The motion of Weber Oil Company for summary 
judgment (R. 188-189) 'vas for a decree of summary 
judgment against the plaintiffs adjudicating Weber Oil 
Company to be the owner of an undivided one-half in-
terest in the lessee's rights under the Sheridan Lease, 
and that the plaintiffs, and each of them, have no right, 
title, interest or estate in or to the undivided one-half 
interest in said Sheridan Lease so adjudicated as held, 
ovvned and possessed by defendant Weber Oil Company. 
The motion vvas based upon the decision of this Court 
in its Case 7723 (255 P. 2d 989) and the remittitur issued 
on January 20, 1954, to which judgment reference is made 
by the ~feagher affidavit on motion for summary judg-
ment (R. 179). The plaintiffs, as well as the defendant 
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Weber Oil Company, were claiming that their respective 
motions should be granted on the former Dunford judg-
ment as affirmed on appeal. 
All of the counts of the complaint are premised upon 
the proposition that the plaintiffs have an undivided 
one-half interest in the Sheridan Lease as against all 
of the defendants, and the complaint refers to and at-
tempts a construction of the decision of this Court to that 
effect in the last appeal. The motions to dismiss made by 
Weber Oil Company (R. 72-77) effectively raised the 
issue as to whether the action could be so litigated as 
against Weber Oil Company, but most certainly, as the 
matter was submitted on the motions for summary judg-
ment, the title question had resolved itself to the point 
where, as a matter of law, the court was required to say 
that \\T eber Oil Company is the owner of an undivided 
one-half interest in the lessee's rights under the Sheridan 
Lease and that the plaintiffs have no right, title, interest 
or estate therein. 
The Interlocutory Judgment and Decree appealed 
from delineates, in f.avor of the plaintiffs, a 25% title out 
of the Phebus side of the Sheridan Lease and takes from 
Weber the adjudicated Stock and Juhan portion, and 
thus would amend, Yary, contradict, reverse and annul the 
Dunford decree ns affirn1ed by this Court on appe.al in 
that regard. In the instant case the trial court could not 
nor can it b(\ presun1ed to haYe departed fron1 the affirm-
ed Dunford decree as to Stock and Juhan. ''Te point to 
the expression of this Court in DTtah Copper Co. v. Dis-
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trict Court, 91 Utah 377, 64 P. 2d 241: 
"The rule is well established and there does 
not seem to be anything to the contrary that when 
a case has been determined by a reviewing court 
and remanded to the trial court, the duty of the 
latter is to comply with the mandate of the former. 
The mandate is binding on the lower court and 
must be strictly followed and carried into effect 
.according to its true intent and meaning as de-
termined by the directions given by the reviewing 
court. When the trial court fails or refuses to obey 
or give effect to the mandate or remittitur, or 
misconstrues it or acts beyond its province in car-
rying it out, it becomes the province and duty of 
the appellate court to enforce compliance there-
'vith, and it is generally recognized that such 
may be done on writ or order of mandamus. The 
lower court upon remand of a c.ase from a higher 
court, must obey the mandate or remittitur and 
render judgment in conformity thereto and has no 
authority to enter any judgment not in conformity 
with the order. Whatever comes before and is de-
cided and disposed of by the reviewing court is 
considered as finally settled and the inferior 
court to which a mandate issues is bound by the 
decree .as the law of the case and must carry it into 
execution according to the mandate, and after the 
reviewing court has determined the case before 
it and remanded it to the lower court, the latter 
is without power to modify, alter, amend, set 
aside, or in any manner disturb or depart from 
the judgment of the reviewing court; that the 
judgment of the higher court is not reviewable 
in ,any way by the court below and the lower court 
cannot vary or examine the decree of the higher 
court for .any other purpose than execution, or 
give any other or further relief or review it even 
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for apparent error upon any matter decided on 
appeal, or meddle with it further than to settle 
so much as has been remanded." (Emphasis 
added.) 
The plaintiffs, if they have any title in the Sheridan 
Lease, have 25% of the lessee's rights with respect to 
oil, less the proportionate share of operating expendi-
tures. Stock and Juhan have 25% and Weber Oil Com-
pany has 50%. The plaintiffs have no interest in the 
April 9, 1951 .agreement (Appendix L, Plaintiffs' Brief). 
POINT 2. 
THE INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF 
DECEMBER 13, 1955, IS VOID AS TO WEBER OIL COM-
PANY. 
By its rulings on motions on October 1-±, 1955 (R .. 
213-215) the court exercised all of the authority afforded 
it under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. There-
after the onlv issues left to be tried were those specifi-
o/ 
cally reserved as against Equity Oil Company. The rul-
ings on n1otions dated, signed by the court and filed in 
the action effectively dispose of all the ren1aining eounts 
against the defendant ,, ... eber Oil Con1pany, and speci-
fieally grants ''T eber Oil Co1npany's n1otion for sun1n1ary 
judg1nent thereon. There "Tere no reserYed issues against 
any defendant Pxrept Equity Oil Co1npany and then only 
in its status as a stakeholder. 
Proceedings under Rule 56 are su1nn1ary in their 
very nature .and require the judgment to be entered 
"forthwith''. No findings are required and the judgment 
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so entered is final, except as provided in subdivision (d) 
of the rule. In the instant matter the only party remain-
ing in the action is Equity Oil Company. The Fourth 
Count of Plaintiffs' complaint had been dismissed by the 
formal order of the court dated December 21, 1954 (R. 
113-114). 
There was no appeal from the rulings of October 14, 
1955, .and it was not until after the time for appeal had 
expired that the court entered the so-called Interlocutory 
Judgment and Decree as drafted by plaintiffs. The 
ruling of October 14, 1955, is not an order for a judgment 
or a memorandum from vvhich the judgn1ent was to be 
dra\vn. It is not a minute entry. It is a final judgment. 
The rulings embody the self executing order granted on 
defendants' motions for sununary judgment. The time 
for an .appeal could not be extended by the Interlocutory 
Judgment and Decree of December 13th nor could the 
court make such further order without first having set 
aside its order of October 14th. 
In Mower v. "Af cCarthy, ______ Utah ______ , 245 P. 2d 224, 
the dissenting opinion suggests, under Article VIII, Sec-
tion 9, Constitution of Utah, that this Court is powerless 
to review an appeal in cases of law without findings of 
fact. This Court held, notwithstanding the constitutional 
• provision, that in reviewing a c.ase involving certain 
rules of civil procedure where issues of fact are involved 
and there are no findings of fact it is assumed that the 
trier of the facts found them in accord with its decision. 
The reason given by the lower court in the instant case 
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is that the prior action, Case 2238, determined the title 
issues and stated in effect that the Dunford decision, as 
affirmed, was res judicata as to all of the parties. The 
defendants could not re-litigate the Stock side of the title 
and the plaintiffs could notre-litigate so as to reach over 
into the Phebus side of the title. 
Plaintiffs contend that the Interlocutory Judgment 
and Decree of December 13, 1955, is interlocutory as to 
Weber Oil Company and the individual defendants, as 
well as to Equity Oil Company. The alleged decree as to 
Weber is void but, nevertheless, Weber Oil Company can 
invoke this Court's judgment on the voidness of the al-
leged decree by appeal to this Court, \vhich it is doing. 
See Openshaw v. Young, 107 Utah 399, 152 P. 2d 84. 
Admittedly the rulings of October 14, 1955, are inter-
locutory as to Equity Oil Company in its status of stake-
holder and as to it there is no appeal until a final judg-
ment. It must be assumed, however, that the trial court 
correctly interpreted the decision of this Court in the 
former case and that when it directed an accounting 
against Equity Oil Con1pany of one-half of the proceeds 
after operating expenses are deducted it was referring 
to· one-half of the 40.75~c of the gross crude oil runs in 
Equity's hands as stakeholder. All of which is consistent 
\vith the Dunford decree as an1ended on appeal \o this 
Court. 
POINT 3. 
THIS COURT CAN ONLY ACT HEREIN AS AN APPEL-
LATE COURT AND NOT AS A COURT HAVING ORIGINAL 
JURISDICTION. 
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Point 2 of plaintiffs' brief would have this Court re-
write the Interlocutory . Judgment and Decree so that 
Weber Oil Company, Stock and Juhan are obligated to 
account and pay or, in the alternative, that this Court 
umake clear that the lower court is not precluded from 
making such provision when rendering its further orders 
and decrees in this matter." We submit that such is not 
the function of the appellate court. 
The third point argued by plaintiffs boils down to 
a "request" that this Court make "a clear declaration" 
that Equity Oil Company is not a stakeholder but is a 
principal, if not the principal defendant in the action. 
The order of September 23, 1954 (R. 12·3-125) states: 
"4. That the defendant Equity Oil Company, 
pursuant to the stipulation of the parties made 
in open court, continue to hold in a special fund 
an amount equal to 40.75 per cent of the gross 
crude oil runs from the property described in 
plaintiffs' complaint after deducting operating 
expenses, until the further order of the Court." 
(Emphasis added.) 
It 'vas upon that theory that the motions for summary 
judgment were argued to the trial court. Consistent there-
·with the court, in its rulings on motions on October 14, 
1955 (R. 213-215), stated : 
"The Equity Oil Company appears only as a 
stakeholder. It has, pursuant to agreement with 
the Plaintiffs, maintained a special account of an 
amount equal to at least 40.75 per cent of the gross 
crude oil runs after expenses of operations." (Em-
phasis added.) 
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Plaintiffs do not point to anything in the record that 
would relieve them from the solemn pronouncement of 
the stakeholder status of Equity Oil Company. There 
is nothing that will support their change of theory and 
there is nothing before this Court that will permit its 
intervention, sitting as an appellate court, in the absence 
of some appealable record, and as to that there is none. 
Furthermore, it was determined by this Court in the last 
appeal (255 P. 2d 989) that Equity Oil Company trans-
ferred the operating rights to Weber Oil Comp.any, and 
this after a revie'v of the same documents that counsel 
now point to to justify their change of theory. This 
Court, in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, will follow 
the record before it and is limited in its jurisdiction by 
constitutional edict. 
POINT 4. 
THE INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
WAS AN IMPOSITION UPON THE TRIAL COURT. 
(a) The Interlocutory Judgment and Decree is not 
only superfluous and a redundancy in the record after 
the entered and final, as to \\~ eber, order of October 14, 
1955, but it presun1es on its face to be a detern1ination 
of disputed matters of fact. Counsel found it expedient 
to make a recital of instru1nents that 'Yere passed upon 
in the previous ease and 1nerged in the Dunford decree to 
create the iu1pression of findings of fact as if the case 
had been litigated for the first tune in the instant action. 
The only question the eourt had before it on the n1otions 
for sun11nar)r judgment 'vas "~hether, as a 1natter of law, 
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it could say that title issues had been determined. There 
are significant departures from the summary judgment 
of October 14th, and then to cap the climax counsel com-
plain of their own handiwork. They say that Weber Oil, 
Juhan and Stock should be held to account in the same 
manner as Equity. They would expand the judgment and 
distort the rulings of the court even further than they 
have already done by the form of judgment and decree 
that they prevailed upon the court to sign. 
(b) The instrument says nothing about the grant-
ing of Weber Oil Company's motion for summary judg-
ment and which had the effect of dismissing it out of the 
case. Quite to the contrary the form of the instrument 
would retain jurisdiction of the whole action "for such 
further proceedings as shall be deemed necessary upon 
motion of any party or upon the Court's own motion," 
and subtly refers to "costs and interest." As prepared 
by counsel the instrument is cleverly deceptive. 
(c) The reeitals depart from the findings of this 
Court as found at 255 P. 2d 989 at page 991 where this 
Court stated: 
"Defendant Juhan has transferred his interest 
in the operating rights to Equity Oil, and it to 
Weber Oil, neither litigants here." 
Compare this finding, which is the heart of the matter, 
with the language in the December 13th instrument: 
"During the pendency of the .aforesaid liti-
gation, Civil 2238, defendant Joe T. Juhan assign-
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ed portions of whatever interest he may have had 
in the Sheridan Lease to defendant Paul Stock 
and to defendant Equity Oil Company, both of 
whom had actual and constructive notice of the 
prior transfer from defendant Paul Stock to plain-
tiff N.J. Meagher." (R. 219, lines 15-22). 
There was only one time to correct the finding of 
this Court that Juhan "has transferred his interest in 
the operating rights to Equity Oil" and that was on the 
petition for rehearing in the former appeal. If the fact 
was as plaintiffs no-\v claim it to be, they should have 
joined in the petition for rehearing that the defendants 
filed in said action and which this Court had under ad-
visement for many months. By failing to point out the 
error, if in fact there was an error, they lulled this Court 
into complacency and awaited their time to impose upon 
the trial court in the instant case the factual premise as 
if it had never before been determined. 
The trial court ''Tas "po,verless to vary or examine" 
the judgment of this Court for any other purpose than 
execution "or giYe any other or further relief or review 
it even for apparent error upon any matter decided on 
appeal." Utah Copper Co. ~r. District Court, supra. In 
this State, at h•ast, counsel cannot deliberately lead the 
court into error. Pettiupill r. Perkins, 2 lTtah 2d 266, 
272 P. 2d 185. 
(d) The sun1n1a ry judg1nent of October 14th re-
quires Equity Oil C'1on1pany to account to all of the par-
tie~--uo/ just to the illragher ch£ld1·en as provided in 
the DeceinlH'r 1 :3th instrument. ''rhy this departure' 
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N. J. Meagher and Katherine T. Meagher, his wife, 
on ~larch 15, 1954, demanded that the defendants pay to 
them, as \vell as their children, their alleged share of the 
proceeds fron1 the oil produced and sold (R. 32-34). Plain-
tiffs' motion for summary judgment in paragr.aph num-
bered 3 (R. 163) says: "That plaintiffs by virtue of their 
ownership of said interest in the Sheridan Lease are en-
titled to an accounting from defendants of their opera-
tions thereunder." N. J. Meagher, in his deposition on 
April 16, 1955, and read into the record (Rep. Tr. 52), 
testified: 
"Q. And you claim the personal right, the indi-
vidual right, of an accounting in this action~ 
A. I think so." 
Exhibit 7 in the instant record is a quitclaim deed 
dated 1\fay 10, 1954, the day before the present action 
was filed, \Vhereby N. J. Th1eagher and Katherine T. 
Meagher, his 'vife, quitclaimed the property specific.ally 
described in the complaint herein to their children, the 
other plaintiffs. The former quitclaim deed from N. J. 
1feagher and Katherine T. Meagher to their children 
dated January 27, 1948, Exhibit A-22 in the prior action, 
was before the discovery of oil. It is settled law in this 
State that .a quitclaim deed does not pass an after ac-
quired title. Duncan v. Hemmelwright 7 112 Utah 262, 
186 P. 2d 965, Dowse v. K ammerman7 ______ Utah ______ , 246 
P. 2d 881. There is respectable authority for the propo-
sition that under an oil and gas lease the right of the 
lessees is merely an option to explore the premises, and 
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no estate, title or interest is vested in the1n prior to the 
discovery of oil through drilling operations : 
"When such oil was discovered on the leased 
premises through the drilling operations, a new 
property was brought into being, consisting of 
the oil in place beneath the surface of the premises. 
It was then that there was discovered the property 
interest." 
Petroleum Exploration et al. v. Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue, (C.C.A. 4th Cir., 1951 
Ill.) 193 F. 2d 59. 
To thus prevail upon the trial judge for a judgment 
by-passing the Senior nieaghers either frqm a tax angle 
or to leave undetermined some facet of the litigation 
that could possibly give rise to future harassment, is 
equally reprehensible. 
(e) Plaintiffs say in their brief at page 11 that 
\Veber Oil Company has never asserted that it acquired 
any interest "in the Stock half" of the lease as a bona 
fide purchaser for value. This begs the question because 
it has heretofore been adjudicated and it is admitted 
in these proceedings that ,, ... eber has the Phebus half of 
the Sheridan Lease. Plaintiffs atte1npt to delineate 
through the recitals of the Dece1nber 13th instrun1ent ~ 
title in \A.T eber fron1 the Stock half~ not"'"ithstanding the 
previous adjudication and the adrnissions in the instant 
record. Thn t is one of the subtleties of the Dece1nber 13th 
instrunH)nt as prt•pnred hy plaintiffs' counsel. If any 
finding of fact \Yas appropriate, then there should be 
inserted the adn1itted fact that it " ... as after the remittitur 
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in the first appeal that Equity Oil Company, openly 
and notoriously, entered upon the property, drilled for 
and discovered oil; that from the time of the quitclaim 
deed and assignment from Equity Oil Company to Weber 
dated December 30, 1947, and until August 3, 1949, when 
1\ir. 11eagher filed his amended reply in the former ac-
tion, six oil 1vells were completed on the property as pro-
ducers (R. 207-212), all drilled pursuant to a claim of 
right \vithout protest by them. 
POINT 5. 
THE FOURTH COUNT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM AS 
AGAINST ANY OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
This count vvas dismissed out of the action by the 
formal order of the court on December 21, 1954 (R. 113-
114). It is a novel theory to say that one beco~es liable 
through the forbearance of money for income tax conse-
quences. Counsel do not point to any authority support-
ing the claim and we believe none can be found. There 
is no causal connection between .anything that the de-
fendants are alleged to have done or are alleged to have 
omitted doing and the obligation to pay income tax. 
CONCLUSION 
We not only challenge the integrity of plaintiffs' brief 
in light of the record, but also their good faith in their 
submission to the trial court of the Interlocutory J udg-
ment and Decree dated December 13, 1955, differing so 
obviously from the rulings of October 14, 1955. The brief 
does not contain a forthright statement of the record 
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in the instant case, from which record it is obvious that 
the Interlocutory Judgment and Decree of December 13th 
is a nullity and a document from which the plaintiffs 
cannot appeal. The court below disposed of the action, 
so far as Weber Oil Company is concerned, by its sum-
mary judgment entered on October 14, 1955, from which 
there was no timely appeal. The judgment adjudicating 
one-half of the leasehold interest to Weber Oil Company 
is final. 
The appeals from the so-called Interlocutory Judg-
ment and Decree should be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS, 
~IATTSSON & EVANS 
Attorneys for Appellant and 
Respondent Weber Oil Company 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
